Guerilla War My @$$

For all of those who think North Korea can fend off UN Forces and ROK Forces with guerilla warfare, think twice:

Following Operation OH JAC KYO in July 1967 the Korean 9th and Capital
Divisions thwarted enemy intentions to go on the offensive in Phu Yen Province
by inflicting large troop and equipment losses primarily on the North Vietnamese
95th Regiment. Operation HONG KIL DONG alone accounted for 408 enemy killed and
a kill ratio of 15 to 1 between 9 and 31 July. By the time the operation was
terminated on 28 August, in order to provide security for the coming elections,
the total enemy killed had reached 638 and the kill ratio was 24 to 1. In
addition, some 98 crew-served and 359 individual weapons had been captured.

During 1968 the pattern of Korean operations did not change materially from
that of previous years; the Korean troops continued to engage in extensive small
unit actions, ambushes, and battalion and multi-battalion search and destroy
operations within or close to their tactical areas of responsibility. Over-all
these operations were quite successful. An analysis of an action by Korean
Capital Division forces during the period 2329 January 1968 clearly illustrates
the Korean technique. After contact with an enemy force near Phu Cat, the
Koreans "reacting swiftly . . . deployed six companies in an encircling maneuver
and trapped the enemy force in their cordon. The Korean troops gradually
tightened the circle, fighting the enemy during the day and maintaining their
tight cordon at night, thus preventing the enemy's escape. At the conclusion of
the sixth day of fighting, 278 NVA had been KIA with the loss of just 11
Koreans, a kill ratio of 25.3 to 1."

Later in 1968 a Korean 9th Division operation titled BAEK Ma 9 commenced on
11 October and ended on 4 November with 382 enemy soldiers killed and the North
Vietnamese 7th Battalion, 18th Regiment, rendered ineffective. During this
operation, on 25 October, the eighteenth anniversary of the division, 204 of the
enemy were killed without the loss of a single Korean soldier.

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/allied/ch06.htm#b4

He would carry that pride in his heritage throughout an impressive and sometimes harrowing military tour. In Korea, he trained at ROK Ranger School, a nine-and-a-half-week program where the attrition rate was so high Americans are no longer allowed to take it.

http://www.tnwildside.org/stories.asp?Guide=Craig+Morgan

Many American operators consider some of the South Korean commando training even tougher than that found in American special operations schools. The Koreans have long had a tradition of toughness, and the concept of highly selective commando units who went through brutal training, had a lot of appeal in South Korea.

http://www.strategypage.com/fyeo/howtomakewar/databases/commandos/commandos.asp